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COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.

were partly because it would have been impossible to find a sovereign
who had not in some way exhibited bias in favor either of the North or
South during our ciil war, and partly because the questions involved in
the controversy, relating as they did to those principles of international
law which affect the rights and duties of neutrals, were of too great
importance to the civilized world to entrust the decision of them to any
one man. For the determination of such great questions an international
"tribunal composed. of leading jurists, selected largely and, if possible,
entirely, from different neutral countries, is better adapted than any other
system which has hitherto been devised, and, as Mr. BALcH very justly
observes on page 17 of his pamphlet, "we may reasonably expect that
through such tribunals, through their proceedings and decisions, and not
through empirical codes, we may ultimately arrive at some more tangible
and better ordered sysfem of inteinational law; one t o which the assent
of civilized peoples may be giver, greatly to the benefit of mankind."
R. D.

COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.
ThE MEmAmCS' LIEN LAw OF PENNSYLVANIA.
IN the year i89o it was assumed, as the ground of the. judgments in
Schroder v. Galland, 134 Penna., 277,.and Benedict v. Hood, Id., A§, that
the basis of a lien on a building for work or materials furnished was the
contract of the owner of the land 'on which it stands.. There was there
applied the ordinary rule that all persons dealing with an agent must
ascertain the extent of his authority, and if he has stipulated there should
be no lien, no one furnishing the labor or materials can have one.
The legislation of 1891, P. L., page 2z5, has.changed this, and few, if
any, of the Bar have ever questioned the validity of this Act, but the
reporter of the Supreme Court has seen fit to do so in afoot-note, 146 Pa.,
12o. "It
may then, therefore, possibly be worth while to recall to the recollection of those concerned some matters which have been overlooked or
forgotten. It wl be found that the legislation of 189i simply restores the
law as it was established by a series of decisions for half a century. And
these have escaped observation probably because they have one and all
been omitted from the book on which the profession relies in such mat-ters. Mr. Wharton printed them; Mr. Brightley's book superseded
Wharton, and he drops them out with6ut explanation or a word of caution that I am aware of; not one is cited by counsel or referred to by the
Court. I mean the rule of the Mechanics' Lien Law.
To make this matter clear, it is, perhaps, necessary to state the legislation on the subject which preceded the Act under which we had lived
for fifty-four years, during which time it is quite certain that no one had

.1

COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.

ever suggested that the owner of the land could, by any such contrivance
as that which was resorted to in the case that has been mentioned, prevent any one who furnished materials or labor from obtaining a lien on
the groufd and building, if the building was erected at his instance and
he was in 1possession.
It is useless to spend time over the Act of i8oj. We begin with the
Act of x8o6. This was the first Act which has any real bearing on the
subject. And without referring to it and to the judicial exposition of its
meaning, we are quite likely to get a very incorrect notion of the meaning of
the Act of 1836, and of the modification of that Act by the Act of 184o.
The Act of 18o6 (4 Smith, 4) pr6vided that all buildings (it was
originallylocal, but was largely extended) shall be subject to the payment
of debts contracted for, or by reason of work done or materials found or
provided by any person employed in furnishing materials for, or in the
erecting or constructing such building before 'any other lien which
originated subsequent to the commencement of the building. It then
limited the lien as to time, unless there was an action. The supplemental
Act of i8o8 gave a right to sue in fiersonam or in rem by scire facias-.
Atteition is called to the absence of all reference to the owner of
either building or land, so far as his intervention or consent to the putting
up of the building was concerned, or to the contracting the debt for the
'work or materials, or authorizing this contract. It is not to the present
pui-pose whjether there is not enough in the Act to have authorized the
construction that the owner of the land must have authorized the cqntracting of the debts. It is rather difficult to deny this, looking at the
remedy given by the supplement of r8o8, 4 SM., 528, which was alternate
or optional. against the owner in person, or against the building; on the
other hand, the restriction of the remedy to the res may be said 'to point
the other way.
The justification for the construction put on the Act by the Court by
GIBsoN, C. J., in O'Connor v. Warner, 4 W. & S., 223, evidently shows
that there was great surprise and evident dissatisfaction at this construction, and this -was so strong that the legislation had then interfered.
However this may be, whatever may be said for the differing opinions, or
rather, views of the bar, the legislature or the Court, it is not open to dispute that the meaning of this Act was settled; and this was that the lien
was imposed without any reference to the action on inaction of the owner
of the land. It was not necessary that he should have consented to the
erection of the building; he may even have been incapable of contracting
for such a thing, yet his land was bound.
The decisions, it cannot be disputed, established this, and they are
justified in the elaborate judgment in O'Connor v. Warner, that leaves
no room for doubt of the meaning or the intention of the Court. In
Savoy v. Jones, 2 Rawle, 243, the estate of a remainderman under a settlement was held to pass by a sale under a lien for bricks furnished the
equitable tenant for life, GBsoN, C. J., saying that by the Act the land
was pledged irrespective of ownership. In Baker v. Jones, 9 W., 9, a purchaser, by a verbal contract, contracted a debt in building, and the legal
title was held to be bound by the lien. In Anchutz v. McClelland, 5 W.,
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487, a lessee foryears was the person who put up the building; the title of
a trustee for the separate use of the wife of the lessor was held bound. In
Bickel v. Jones, 7 W., 9, the estate of -a vendor was-held bound by a lien
for a building contracted for by the vefidee. A sentence of GIBSON,
C. J., is deserving notice; it is this-by the Act'the legislaturehyothecated
buildings for debts contracted in their construction. It is impossible to
exclude all intervention of the owner more absolutely. In Holdship v.
Abercrombie, 9 W., 52, the same decision, was made as in Anchutz v.
McClelland,- 5 W;, 487, and on the same title.
Savoy v. Jones, the first of these cases, was -decided in January, 1830,
-and the next legislation was theAct of the 16th of June, x836. All the
other cases were decided after the passage of that Act,.though all relate
'to the older Act. But the interpretation of the Act of i8o6 had been
known for years, and this new Act was prepared by a -commission. No
one could pretend haste or inadjertence in drafting it. By it every building erected was made subject to a lien for the payment of all 'debts contracted for work done or materials furnished for or about the erection or
construction of the same. It will be observed there is not a word that
even .y implication requires the biiUding to be erected with the consent
of the owner nor his assent to the contract by which th6 debt was created.
Beside this, the remedy-was so changed as to eliminate all grounds for
argument that it was understood or implied that he should have even
consented to the erection of the building. It was confined to the building, and a refuted owner was made a sufficient patty. " Of course the
right of action on the contract existed. Then came the five decisions as
to the effect and intention of the old Act.
By this time there was evidently a disturbance in the public mind."
If we look at the decisions the inferior Coirts were hard to restrain; at
*all-eVents,'it is evident that the community were not at all prepared to
admit a novelty such as this into their system. The remedy is amusing
-if oue can shut his eyes to the cruelty 9f inviting a mechanic to invest his
property on the faith of the legislative grant expounded by the Court, and
then deprive him of it, for the new Act left no room for debate as to its
meaning and intent, nor could there be any debate as to its legality after
six decisions of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, on the' 28th of April,
184o, P. L., 474, the legislature enacted that the lien -given by the Act of
i836 shall not be construed to extend to-any other or greater estate than
that of the person in possession at the time of commencing the building,
and at whose instance the same was erected, and no other estate.shall be
sold under any execution authorized by the Act.
It is iiot at all necessary, nor will it serve any good purpose to further
comment on this mode of dealing with the unfortunate. people who had
purchased a right under the Act of 1836, by selling or furnishing materials
or labor. -It is sufficient to say thatthe great Chief Justice proved himself
equal to the occasion. In 1839 a lease was made of a lot and the lessee
put up a building, and, in doing so, contracted a "debt for which a claim
was filed,- and under this the lot was sold, and all this occurred before the
Act of 184o wag passed.
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by the Court admitted that the object of the Act of 1836 was the same as
that of i8o6, that the revisors prepared it, knowing the construction of the
former Act, and not intending to change it; and while denying the power
of the legislature to change the meaning of a Statute, if that had been
declared by the Court, yet as there had been no exposition of this statute,
the judiciary were bound to accept the exposition of the legislature,
because it was susceptible of such an explanation. Singular casuistry.
Two things seem to have been overlooked; that on the previous page
of this judgment it is admitted that the Act does not mean what the legislature says it shall be said to mean, and that it was not the intention of
the draftsman to give this meaning, but, on the contrary, to adopt a
statute in conformity to the construction of the old one. I have pointed
out how much clearer the intention is in the later than in the earlier one.
The other point overlooked is that there had been a judgment and it was
unreversed, and it was in rem, and at the time of the sale it bound the
res. The value of this judgment lies in the fact that there is the most
elaborate justification of the judgments that I have cited, and .most
pointedly that the Act did certainly mean to subject the land to debt contracted in building, irrespective of the wishes, intention or consent of the
owner.
Now, it is of the utmost importance to consider the Act of i84o, t4e
evil to be remedied, the mode of doing this, and the language selected for
the purpose. The evil was the imposition of a lien for the cost of a.
building not authorized to be erected by the owner of the land. The
mode of correcting this was by limiting the lien to the estates of the
owner, who, being in possession, did authorize the building. And the
language used excludes the property of owners who merely assent to such'
erection, or who even compel the erection, by confining it to the estate of
the owners at whose instance the building is erected, and who are in -. ossession at the commencement of the building. Thus, grantors on ground
rent and mortgages, who have stipulated for a building are excluded.
But it should be noticed that the assent to the contract or to the furnishing materials is not required by the new Act any more than by the old, if
the party in possession authorizes the building or does anything that
-makes it to be erected at his instance,for the lien is imposed not by the
owner, but by the legislature. Nor can anyone dispute it is quite enough
if the owner has it in his option to make a lien possible by refusing to
consent to a building. He cannot be bound if a tenant or anyone puts it
up." It is always in his power, when he consents to a building being put
-up, to protect himself not from the right to a lien, but from the fact of a
lien existing in any injurious form, even when he is the person at whose
instance it is erected.
It never was intended that the owner of the land by restricting the
right of his builder or contractor could exclude the lien. A moment's
reflection would have shown that the statute was a mere trap for the
unwary if this were so. And that as soon as such a rule was promulgated,
there never would be a chance for a lien to exist. No one but the
unlearned in the tricks of the trade would ever voluntarily fail to excludethe right of lien.
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As to the power of the legislature to give such a lien, it 'would hardly
be worthy of discussion, even if it.had not been six times decided. It is
true, the point was ruled sub silentio, but then decisions thus made are of
more weight than many that are the deductions of what passes for logic.
No more powerful exponent of' Constitutional law can be set up than
-common consent where the circumstances have suggested a dispute.
R. C. McM.

WHEN, if ever, we have provided for us a new edition of" Reid's Reference Index," or whenever a fiew book of a similar character andpurpose
is published, I trust there maybe a change in the method. In May, z889,
the Supreme Court established a rule that "Pennsylvania cases decided
since the commencement of the State Reports must be cited by the
volume of said State Reports." The name of the reporter is eliminated,
and the practice of the Court is to cite "124 Pa. 170. '
In Ried, published in 1891, we have the cumbrous "P. S. R1." in
large capitals, and the leading case is followed by references to "Smith"
and "Jones," and other reporters by name. Nor do we find any chronology in the book. To give a single instance of that seems to me to be
serious, if not fatal fault in the book, will illustrate what I mean.
"Johnson v. Currin, 1o P. S. R., 498. [Qualified. in 6 C.; not perfectly sound, 5 Sm.; contrary to the general current of authority, x
Penn'r, 19]. Executory Devise, grand-children, 24 Sin., 42o. As to 'the
intention always governing,' 6 C., 165; 5 Sm., 49o; Limitations" over, 4
WrL., 23."
The changes I would note as coming within the scope, convenience
and necessity of the case, are these, and such as these:
" "Johnson v. Currin, io Pa. 498 (1849.) [Qualified in 30 Pa., 6S
(1§58 ) ; not perfectly sound, 55 Pa. 490 4867); Contrary to the general
current of authority, i Penn'r, ir9 (1881)]. Executory Devise, grandchildren, 74 Pa, 42o (874). As to the intention always governing;3o Pa.,
z65 (1858); 74 Pa., 490 (1874). Limitations over, 40 Pa., 23 (1861).
Thus we have the history and chronology of the point, and a uniform
-system of rotation and reference. Ried is a great improvement upon
Lynntnd Landis, and he is entitled to credit for the special matters to which
he calls attention. But with Lynn, Landis and Wright before him something more might have been expected. Wright is open to some, if notall
of the objections made to Reid, but then Wright is nearly ten years old,
and reporting, digesting and indexing have improved since Wharton and
Wright began. A well-made paper-book gives the date of the case
quoted, and is often of importance. I do not know that enclosing the
year in parenthesis is necessary or proper. That may be for the printers.
BLOOMSBU~iG, PA.

J. G. F.

